RBI Fines MobiKwik ₹9 Lakh for Prepaid Payment Instrument and Fraud Reporting Failures
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has imposed a monetary penalty of ₹9 lakh on One MobiKwik Systems Limited for failing to comply with regulatory requirements governing prepaid payment instruments (PPIs) and fraud reporting. The action follows a statutory inspection that identified weaknesses in the company's controls over transfers to non-registered beneficiaries and the timely reporting of fraud incidents.

The penalty was imposed through an order dated 6 November 2026 and announced by the RBI on 13 November. The regulator exercised its powers under Section 30(1), read with Section 26(6), of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.
The inspection covered MobiKwik's operations between June 2025 and March 2026. Following its supervisory review, the RBI issued a show-cause notice requiring the company to explain why a monetary penalty should not be imposed. After considering MobiKwik's written response, additional submissions and representations made during a personal hearing, the regulator concluded that two instances of non-compliance had been established.
The first concerned the company's handling of transfers made by certain prepaid payment instrument holders. The RBI found that MobiKwik had allowed customers to transfer funds to beneficiaries who had not been pre-registered, beyond the limits prescribed under the applicable regulatory directions.
Prepaid payment instruments are payment facilities that allow customers to store monetary value electronically and use it for transactions, transfers and other permitted services. They are widely used in India through digital wallets, prepaid cards and other electronic payment products. The RBI imposes specific restrictions on transfers from these instruments, including requirements relating to beneficiary registration and transaction limits.
These restrictions are intended to provide greater control over the movement of funds and reduce opportunities for misuse. Requiring beneficiaries to be registered before certain transfers take place allows payment providers to establish relevant recipient information and apply the appropriate transaction limits. Failure to enforce these requirements can weaken controls over the movement of money between customers and third parties.
The second finding concerned delays in reporting certain fraud incidents. The RBI determined that MobiKwik had failed to report some frauds within the prescribed timeframe. Timely reporting is an important component of payment-system supervision, as it enables regulators to identify emerging fraud patterns, assess potential vulnerabilities and take action where wider risks may exist.
The two findings relate to different stages of the payment control framework. Beneficiary registration and transfer restrictions are preventive measures intended to ensure that transactions comply with applicable requirements before funds are transferred. Fraud reporting, by contrast, is a post-incident obligation that supports regulatory oversight and the identification of suspicious or potentially widespread activity.
The RBI did not disclose the number or value of the transactions involved, the specific fraud incidents that were reported late or the duration of the delays. It also did not identify the technical or operational causes behind the failures. Consequently, the penalty should be understood as an enforcement action concerning regulatory compliance rather than evidence of a particular fraud scheme or money laundering activity.
The regulator expressly clarified that its action was based on deficiencies in compliance with its directions and was not intended to determine the validity of transactions or agreements entered into by MobiKwik with its customers. It also stated that the imposition of the penalty does not prevent it from taking further action against the company.
For digital payment providers, the case highlights the importance of ensuring that transaction-processing systems consistently enforce beneficiary registration requirements and applicable transfer limits. Compliance cannot rely solely on written policies or customer-facing procedures. The relevant restrictions must be incorporated into operational systems and applied accurately when transactions are authorised.
The findings also underline the need for effective fraud-reporting arrangements. Payment providers should maintain procedures that enable incidents to be identified, assessed and escalated promptly, with clear responsibility for regulatory notifications. Delays can undermine the ability of supervisory authorities to obtain an accurate and timely picture of fraud affecting the payment system.
The case is particularly relevant to fintech businesses operating digital wallets and other prepaid payment products, as their services can involve large numbers of transactions and frequent transfers between customers and third parties. As digital payment activity continues to expand, regulators are increasingly focused on the effectiveness of the systems and controls supporting these services.
Although the financial penalty is relatively limited in amount, the enforcement action demonstrates that failures involving transaction restrictions and reporting obligations can result in direct regulatory consequences. For payment institutions and other fintech providers, maintaining effective preventive controls and timely incident-reporting procedures remains essential to regulatory compliance and the integrity of digital payment services.
By fLEXI tEAM





Comments