Leaked Deutsche Bank Documents Reveal Suspected €1.7 Billion Russian Money Laundering Network Through Hungary
An international investigative collaboration has uncovered details of an alleged Russian money laundering network that transferred at least €1.7 billion through a series of offshore companies and financial institutions between 2017 and 2020. Leaked internal documents from Deutsche Bank indicate that Hungary's MKB Bank, which was controlled by businessmen closely associated with former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, played a significant role in facilitating the transactions.

The findings form part of an investigation titled *Inside Deutsche Bank*, involving more than 200 journalists from over 50 media organisations. The investigation draws on millions of leaked internal records, including transaction histories, correspondence, financial crime reports and internal risk assessments.
According to the documents, the network, internally referred to as Project Wingman, involved at least 15 central companies, many of which were registered in offshore jurisdictions, including Hong Kong and Cyprus. Several of these entities were reportedly connected to Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, who was sanctioned by the United States in April 2018.
MKB Bank emerged as a central intermediary in the network. Five of the 15 key companies reportedly maintained accounts with the Hungarian institution despite having no apparent commercial connection to Hungary. At least €460 million passed through these accounts. More than half of the transactions examined in the relevant investigation involved MKB, which provided access to international payment infrastructure through its correspondent banking relationships.
The bank came under the control of businessmen associated with Orbán in 2017. Among its investors was Lőrinc Mészáros, a Hungarian businessman who became one of the country's wealthiest individuals during Orbán's time in office.
One of the companies identified in the investigation was Dempshire Corporation, a Hong Kong-registered entity linked to individuals within Deripaska's business network. Between January 2017 and February 2020, the company transferred nearly €160 million into the wider network and received approximately €136 million. Investigators also identified payments to Austrian businesses, including private aviation operator Avcon Jet, which reportedly received more than €8 million.
Deutsche Bank's internal records indicate that concerns about the network emerged well before the full scale of the transactions was established. In 2014, the bank had already identified Deripaska as a significant reputational risk. Its financial crime specialists subsequently recommended ending business relationships with companies under his control. However, other divisions considered him an important commercial client, and the bank continued providing services.
Following the imposition of US sanctions against several Russian businessmen in 2018, including Deripaska, concerns regarding the bank's exposure increased. Nevertheless, accounts belonging to certain individuals and associated companies continued to be serviced.
Deutsche Bank initiated a more extensive review of MKB's activities in late 2019, requesting information about its foreign customers, onboarding procedures, high-risk accounts and anti-money laundering controls. Although MKB indicated that it was reducing its exposure to offshore customers, Deutsche Bank's internal transaction data did not show a corresponding significant reduction in payments originating from non-resident clients.
The German bank eventually decided to terminate its correspondent banking relationship with MKB in 2020. However, the withdrawal was managed gradually because of concerns that an immediate termination could disrupt payment flows and create liquidity difficulties for the Hungarian institution.
The investigation also raises questions about the effectiveness of Deutsche Bank's own financial crime controls. Internal assessments reportedly identified weaknesses in the bank's systems for monitoring transactions processed through correspondent banking relationships. Although suspicious activity reports had been submitted concerning certain transactions, the bank initially failed to connect individual warning signs into a broader picture of the suspected network.
German authorities launched an investigation into the suspected money laundering activities in 2020 and sought cooperation from Hungarian counterparts. However, the cross-border investigation encountered jurisdictional difficulties, and German prosecutors subsequently closed their broader investigation. The reporting does not establish that Hungarian authorities deliberately protected MKB or knowingly facilitated criminal activity through the bank.
The findings highlight several significant vulnerabilities in international banking and anti-money laundering controls. Correspondent banking relationships can provide access to international payment systems for institutions whose customers and underlying transactions are located across multiple jurisdictions. Where these relationships are not subject to sufficiently robust oversight, they may be exploited to move substantial sums through complex corporate structures.
The case also demonstrates the limitations of relying exclusively on individual suspicious transaction alerts. Financial institutions must be capable of identifying connections between apparently unrelated companies, payment flows and beneficial ownership structures. Repeated transactions involving offshore entities, non-resident customers and counterparties associated with high-risk individuals may require a broader assessment of the underlying financial activity.
For compliance professionals, the investigation reinforces the importance of enhanced due diligence on correspondent banking relationships, effective assessment of politically exposed persons and associated business networks, and continuous monitoring of transactions involving sanctioned individuals. Particular attention should be given to indirect exposure through companies, intermediaries and complex ownership arrangements.
The findings also illustrate that sanctions screening and AML transaction monitoring must operate together. Identifying a sanctioned individual is not sufficient if associated companies and indirect financial relationships are not properly assessed. Institutions must understand who ultimately owns or controls the entities involved and whether transactions may be benefiting designated persons.
The investigation raises broader questions about the ability of financial institutions and regulatory authorities to identify and respond to complex cross-border financial crime networks, particularly where politically connected businesses, offshore companies and correspondent banking arrangements intersect. It underlines the importance of effective information sharing, timely escalation of suspicious activity and consistent application of risk-based controls across international banking relationships.
By fLEXI tEAM





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