Russian Payment Firm A7 Processed More Than $14 Billion in Cash Amid Sanctions Evasion Concerns

A7, a Russian payment company backed by the Russian state, processed at least 283 metric tonnes of cash rubles worth more than US$14 billion between November 2024 and July 2025, according to an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and Russian independent media outlet Proekt. The findings raise concerns about how large volumes of cash with unverified origins can enter international payment channels and move across borders without clear documentation of their source.

The investigation, published on 21 October 2026, draws on internal company records, payment registers, cash deposit ledgers and interviews with people familiar with A7’s operations. It describes a system in which cash collected through Moscow’s wholesale markets was processed, deposited with Promsvyazbank (PSB), Russia’s state-owned defence bank and a co-owner of A7, and used to support international transfers through companies registered outside Russia.

On 1 October 2026, the US Treasury sanctioned A7, describing it as a significant transnational criminal organisation that uses money-laundering methods to move large sums in violation of sanctions and other laws. The ICIJ investigation provides additional detail about the company’s cash-handling operations and the challenges they may pose for international banks and sanctions enforcement authorities.

A7’s business model incorporates payment brokers operating at Moscow’s Sadovod wholesale market and other commercial locations. According to the records reviewed by investigators, customers bring large amounts of rubles to these brokers, who count the cash and place it into numbered bags alongside payment instructions. The bags are then transported to an A7 processing office, where cashiers verify the amounts and record the details in the company’s payment management system.

The funds are subsequently delivered to PSB, which credits A7 accounts. A7 then arranges for companies outside Russia to make payments on behalf of its clients to overseas beneficiaries, frequently suppliers in China. The international transfers may pass through intermediaries in countries including Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, with payment records indicating that the transactions are often directed towards accounts held by Chinese exporters.

The process creates a significant gap between the original source of the money and the information available to the banks receiving the international transfers. While the cash originates in Russia, the final payment may appear to come from a foreign company rather than from the individuals or businesses that delivered the rubles to A7’s brokers. The investigation found that the underlying cash origin was not reflected in the international transfer documentation examined by reporters.

Internal records indicate that A7’s cash intake increased substantially during the period under investigation. A ledger covering six weeks in November and December 2024 recorded approximately 126 billion rubles, equivalent to around US$1.2 billion at the time. A separate register showed cash intake reaching 195 billion rubles in April 2025 and 250 billion rubles in June 2025. At its peak, the company was reportedly processing at least 58 metric tonnes of cash in a single month.

The investigation identified Moscow’s Sadovod market as a significant source of these funds. The market hosts numerous wholesale businesses selling clothing, jewellery, appliances and other goods, with substantial commercial activity conducted in cash. Internal A7 records reviewed by journalists identified several brokerage teams operating there and showed that payments associated with their customers formed a significant part of the company’s cash-processing activity.

The records also indicated that many of the resulting international payments were connected to trade with China. A payment register documented approximately 2,300 proposed or recorded transfers associated with Sadovod brokerage teams, with beneficiaries or intermediaries in mainland China and Hong Kong. Payments were routed predominantly through the accounts of the Trading Company of the Kyrgyz Republic, a state-owned company, as well as trading companies in Turkey and Hong Kong.

The records identified payments to Chinese export companies holding accounts at major banks, including Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction Bank. One example involved at least 72 payment requests directed to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, in US dollars and Chinese yuan, with a combined equivalent value of approximately US$11 million.

Another example concerned Hong Kong-based Yiton Trading Ltd., which has since been dissolved. A7 records showed 314 payment requests associated with Sadovod brokers and intended for Yiton Trading, with a combined value of approximately US$76 million. The investigation also identified an individual transfer of US$287,000 made through an intermediary’s account at Standard Chartered’s Hong Kong branch to an account held by Yiton Trading at the same bank.

The use of overseas companies and intermediaries is significant because international banks receiving the payments may not have visibility into the original cash deposits or the identities of the individuals who supplied the funds in Russia. Financial crime specialists cited by the investigators warned that this can complicate customer due diligence, source-of-funds verification and the identification of transactions potentially connected to sanctions evasion or money laundering.

The risks are particularly relevant given the restrictions imposed on Russian financial institutions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions and reduced access to conventional international payment channels have encouraged the use of alternative intermediaries to facilitate cross-border settlements. The investigation describes A7 as a large-scale participant in this market, using cash collection, domestic banking infrastructure and foreign corporate entities to facilitate payments that might otherwise encounter difficulties moving through the conventional banking system.

The investigation does not establish that every payment processed by A7 represents criminal proceeds. However, the scale of the cash flows and the lack of traceable information about the origin of substantial amounts raise questions about the effectiveness of controls applied by the company and the brokers collecting funds. It remains unclear what customer identification, source-of-funds and other checks were performed at the collection points.

A7 has rejected allegations of wrongdoing, stating publicly that it operates a multi-tiered compliance system and was established to ensure the continuity of settlements for the Russian market in response to restrictive measures. The company said that its clients undergo screening intended to identify risks and prevent services being provided to individuals or organisations whose activities violate regulatory requirements.

The investigation also reported that PSB typically had to approve payments routed through A7’s domestic system, although the bank did not respond substantively to the journalists’ questions. Sadovod market representatives and several financial institutions approached for comment also did not provide responses to the investigation.

For international banks, the findings highlight the difficulties of assessing payments where the immediate sending entity does not reveal the underlying source of the funds. Effective controls may require scrutiny of payment intermediaries, beneficial ownership, the commercial rationale for transactions, the countries involved and the relationship between a customer’s stated activity and the size or pattern of its payments. Where sanctions exposure is identified, institutions must also assess their obligations under the applicable sanctions regimes.

The case illustrates how cash-based collection systems and cross-border corporate payment chains can reduce transparency in international financial transactions. With A7 now subject to US sanctions, the company’s payment routes and the role of foreign intermediaries are likely to remain areas of attention for financial institutions and authorities investigating potential sanctions evasion and illicit financial flows.

By fLEXI tEAM