Operation Catalyst Exposes Complex Terrorism Financing Web Across Six African Nations

A sweeping multinational operation spanning six African countries has exposed a sophisticated and evolving network of terrorism financing that integrates informal money transfer systems with cryptocurrency-based Ponzi schemes. Conducted between July and September 2025, Operation Catalyst—jointly coordinated by INTERPOL and AFRIPOL—resulted in 83 arrests and uncovered more than USD 260 million in suspicious transactions potentially connected to extremist activity. The investigation offers an unprecedented glimpse into how terrorist groups are modernising their financial architecture, combining conventional laundering techniques with digital innovations to evade scrutiny.

Operation Catalyst marked the first coordinated African initiative to simultaneously confront terrorism financing across borders, uniting expertise in counter-terrorism, financial crime, and cyber investigations. Authorities screened more than 15,000 individuals and entities, revealing a vast web of money movements supporting extremist networks both directly and indirectly.

Cases investigated covered traditional cash couriers, informal value-transfer mechanisms, and complex chains of digital assets. In Angola, authorities detained 25 individuals running unlicensed money-transfer operations outside formal banking systems. Investigators seized USD 588,000, along with 100 mobile phones and 40 computers, and froze 60 bank accounts believed to be channeling funds toward extremist groups.

In Kenya, law enforcement uncovered a virtual-asset platform used to funnel around USD 430,000 into recruitment and propaganda activities. The funds were traced through several crypto wallets and exchanges before being linked to fraudulent online trading operations in Tanzania. The case demonstrated how terrorist networks harness cryptocurrency for both funding and ideological purposes, merging financial crime with digital radicalisation.

Nigeria’s contribution to the operation focused on direct targeting of terrorist leadership. Eleven individuals were arrested, including suspects accused of organising fundraising through scams and fraudulent investment schemes. The case illustrated the overlap between terrorism financing and organised fraud, showing how the same criminal networks used for deception also sustain extremist activity.

One of the most striking findings emerged from a massive Ponzi scheme spanning 17 countries and defrauding over 100,000 victims worldwide, with total losses estimated at USD 562 million. Investigators linked certain crypto wallets associated with the fraud to terrorist organisations. A Red Notice was later issued for the suspected mastermind, whose extensive digital footprint revealed complex laundering routes through multiple cryptocurrency accounts and fiat conversion points.

Collectively, these discoveries portray an adaptive and technologically adept terrorist-financing landscape—one exploiting financial innovation, regulatory weaknesses, and fragmented oversight to sustain operations across borders.

The convergence between money laundering and terrorism financing lay at the heart of Operation Catalyst’s insights. While traditional money laundering is aimed at concealing illicit profits, terrorist financing is focused on maintaining networks, logistics, and propaganda. Yet both rely on the same tools—layering funds, using intermediaries, and cross-border transactions.

In the African cases examined, funds frequently passed through informal transfer systems offering minimal traceability. These networks, often justified as remittance channels in regions with limited banking infrastructure, can easily be co-opted by criminal intermediaries to conceal money linked to extremist operations.

The rise of digital assets has further obscured the line between laundering and terrorist finance. Virtual-asset service providers (VASPs) serve as ideal instruments for layering, allowing rapid transfers between jurisdictions with differing regulatory maturity. Terrorist entities exploit this regulatory gap, converting illicit proceeds from scams into cryptocurrency, distributing them across multiple wallet clusters, and eventually reintegrating them into traditional financial systems.

Operation Catalyst also highlighted how criminal enterprises often fund terrorism indirectly. Online Ponzi schemes and cyber scams generate substantial liquidity that intermediaries redirect toward extremist causes under the guise of legitimate business activity. This merging of criminal profit and ideological purpose makes detection challenging, as the predicate crime often appears non-terrorist in nature.

These revelations reinforce the idea that any profit-driven offense can evolve into a terrorism-financing threat. Terrorist funding is no longer limited to cash smuggling or state sponsorship; it now operates within a digitised ecosystem where fraud, laundering, and extremism converge.

The operation underscored the necessity of international and multi-disciplinary collaboration in combating financial support for terrorism. Traditional anti-money-laundering (AML) frameworks are inadequate for addressing schemes that merge fraud, cybercrime, and extremist finance. By integrating financial-crime specialists, counter-terrorism units, and cyber investigators, Operation Catalyst provided a model for future global enforcement campaigns.

From a regulatory perspective, the findings point to several key lessons. Oversight of virtual assets remains a critical weak point, with many participating jurisdictions lacking comprehensive licensing and reporting standards for VASPs. The operation demonstrated the urgent need for harmonised cross-border rules governing virtual-asset transfers, beneficial ownership transparency, and compliance with the Financial Action Task Force’s travel rule.

Moreover, while informal value-transfer systems are vital for remittances in many African economies, their anonymity leaves them vulnerable to exploitation. Authorities must work with local communities to identify unregistered operators and integrate them into official reporting systems rather than attempting blanket prohibitions.

The operation also reaffirmed the importance of public-private collaboration. Data from blockchain-analytics firms and financial intelligence providers was crucial in tracing suspicious transactions. Financial institutions are encouraged to adopt similar cooperative models, integrating law-enforcement insights into their transaction-monitoring and suspicious-activity reporting frameworks.

For compliance professionals, Operation Catalyst represents a call to action. Terrorism-financing risks must be incorporated into enterprise-wide risk assessments rather than treated as a subcategory of AML or sanctions. Banks and fintech companies operating in or with African jurisdictions should apply enhanced due diligence to high-risk clients involved in remittances, online trading, or cryptocurrency. Training should be expanded to help staff recognise red flags such as repetitive small transfers to unlicensed exchanges, rapid crypto conversions, or heavy reliance on peer-to-peer platforms.

The long-term success of such initiatives depends on building systemic resilience against extremist finance. Strengthening financial inclusion, supervisory capabilities, and technological tools for monitoring transactions across both fiat and virtual assets is essential.

Governments must modernise legal definitions of terrorism financing to include crypto-based and cyber-enabled activities, granting regulators the power to seize and freeze virtual assets linked to extremism. Enhanced mutual-legal-assistance agreements among African nations would also accelerate data sharing and asset recovery.

Financial institutions worldwide must recognise that terrorism financing is a global, not regional, risk. With today’s interconnected financial systems, funds supporting extremist movements can flow through any jurisdiction, regardless of its proximity to conflict zones. Adopting integrated frameworks that link fraud detection, blockchain analytics, and AML/CFT measures is crucial for identifying hidden patterns.

Operation Catalyst has proven that intelligence-led cooperation can yield tangible outcomes, resulting in arrests, asset seizures, and the disruption of financial pipelines that would otherwise sustain instability. Yet, the USD 600,000 already seized represents only a fraction of the USD 260 million in identified suspicious flows—illustrating the immense challenge of tracing assets once they are layered through digital and informal systems. Continued investment in financial intelligence, regional coordination, and technological capacity remains vital to outpace increasingly agile adversaries.

By fLEXI tEAM