Oil Trader’s Prison Sentence Exposes Global Corruption and Money Laundering Network

A former high-level oil trader has been handed a fifteen-month prison term and ordered to pay a $300,000 fine after taking part in an almost eight-year criminal scheme involving bribery of Brazilian government officials and the laundering of corrupt funds to secure profitable business for the commodity firms that employed him. The trader, Glenn Oztemel—formerly with Arcadia Fuels Ltd. and later Freepoint Commodities LLC—participated in conduct that represents a profound breach of international anti-corruption and financial-crime compliance standards. His conviction serves as a pointed reminder of the severe consequences that await both individuals and corporations that attempt to win global commercial opportunities through illicit means.

Evidence laid out at trial showed that Mr. Oztemel was responsible for directing more than $1 million in corrupt payments to officials at Petróleo Brasileiro S.A., or Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned oil and gas conglomerate. These payments formed part of a deliberate money laundering operation intended to insert the illicit proceeds into the legitimate financial operations of Arcadia and Freepoint. In return for the bribe funds, Mr. Oztemel obtained confidential insider data from Petrobras, including sensitive competitor bidding information and proprietary pricing material sourced from other United States companies. This unlawfully derived intelligence gave Arcadia and Freepoint an artificial advantage in securing major Petrobras fuel oil contracts, illustrating the direct link between corruption and the financial crimes that support it.

The conspirators relied on classic layering tactics to hide the nature of their scheme. Mr. Oztemel and his co-schemers arranged for Arcadia and Freepoint to route the corrupt payments through a third-party intermediary and agent, Eduardo Innecco. Internally, the companies booked these transfers as legitimate business costs, recorded as consulting fees and commissions. Mr. Innecco then passed a portion of the funds to Brazilian officials, including Petrobras trader Rodrigo Berkowitz, who was based in Houston. Turning bribe money into purported corporate expenses and moving it through intermediaries before reaching the end recipient reflects the core objective of the layering phase: distancing illicit funds from their criminal origin while burying them within the appearance of lawful transactions.

The operation’s sophistication was further demonstrated through the deliberate techniques used to conceal the scheme. To avoid alerting compliance teams or law enforcement authorities, the conspirators adopted coded language in their communications, substituting terms such as “breakfast” and “freight deviation” to refer to bribe payments and kickbacks. This practice of using jargon to obscure illicit financial flows is common in professionalized criminal networks attempting to evade monitoring tools that flag suspicious terminology. They also refused to rely on corporate communication systems, instead choosing personal email accounts, encrypted messaging platforms, and disposable phones. This move to unmonitored channels underscores a clear intent to circumvent oversight. The use of fabricated identities like “Spencer Kazisnaf” and “Nikita Maksimov” added further layers of anonymity and confusion, showing active steps to prevent the communications trail from being mapped and the money laundering activities from being uncovered.

In a parallel development, Freepoint Commodities LLC admitted its involvement in bribing Brazilian officials and acknowledged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s anti-bribery provisions. The company entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut. Under the agreement, Freepoint agreed to pay more than $98 million in penalties and forfeiture. This corporate settlement reinforces the established legal principle that companies bear liability for criminal acts carried out by their employees when those acts are performed for the benefit of the business, even as individual participants are prosecuted separately for their roles in the conspiracy.

The case also demonstrates the indispensable role of international cooperation in modern AML and anti-corruption enforcement. Because the bribery and money laundering activities moved across multiple countries, the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office’s International Corruption Squad—responsible for spearheading the investigation—depended heavily on assistance from several foreign governments. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs coordinated extensive evidence-gathering efforts, with authorities in Brazil, Latvia, Switzerland, and Uruguay supplying crucial documentation and testimony. These nations function as significant hubs within the global financial system, and their collaboration was vital for tracing the movement of illicit funds across borders. The participation of these diverse jurisdictions illustrates that meaningful AML enforcement now demands unified global action, supported by mutual legal assistance treaties and cross-border investigative frameworks. The success of this international effort underscores the global commitment to protecting financial systems from corruption and its related crimes, reaffirming that neither companies nor individuals can expect immunity when they manipulate international markets through illicit conduct.

The conviction of Glenn Oztemel—returned in September 2024 and covering conspiracy to violate the FCPA, conspiracy to commit money laundering, multiple FCPA violations, and multiple money laundering counts—sends a clear and urgent message throughout the global commodity trading sector. The proceedings reveal that regulators can dismantle even highly sophisticated laundering structures, deceptive corporate documentation, and coded communication strategies designed to obscure wrongdoing. For commodity trading companies, the case highlights the necessity of adopting comprehensive, risk-based AML and anti-bribery compliance frameworks that extend far beyond superficial procedural checks.

Stronger due diligence on third-party agents, intermediaries, and consultants is particularly critical, given their recurring use as conduits for corrupt payments—precisely the role played by the intermediary in this case. Monitoring systems must be capable of detecting not only unusual transactions but also abnormal communication patterns and suspicious internal references. Senior traders and employees operating in high-risk foreign markets require rigorous training on AML and FCPA requirements, especially concerning the proper use of communication channels. The prosecution’s reliance on both FCPA and federal money laundering statutes underscores the inherent connection between bribery and illicit financial flows: any foreign bribery that engages the U.S. financial system triggers substantial liability under both legal regimes. This convergence of legal exposure dramatically heightens the risks for individuals and firms that attempt to use corruption as a business strategy. Ultimately, the case reinforces that only a steadfast commitment to transparent, ethical operations—supported by advanced AML safeguards—can shield global commodity firms from catastrophic legal penalties and irreversible reputational damage.

By fLEXI tEAM