European Task Force Breaks Up €306 Million Transnational Money Laundering Operation

Authorities from France and Romania, working alongside Europol and Eurojust, have successfully taken down an extensive criminal organization responsible for laundering approximately 306 million euros derived from drug trafficking and tax evasion activities. The synchronized enforcement action carried out on February 3, 2026, led to thirteen arrests and the confiscation of large amounts of cash along with numerous high-value luxury goods. Investigators revealed an intricate financial laundering structure designed to convert illegal earnings into legitimate funds through the use of falsified invoices and networks of front companies. Eurojust played a critical coordinating role, helping overcome legal and procedural barriers between jurisdictions throughout a multi-year investigation. The case demonstrates the expanding scale of cross-border financial crime within the European Union and reinforces the importance of multinational law enforcement collaboration to effectively gather and preserve evidence across borders.

The dismantling of an organization capable of processing hundreds of millions of euros in illegal funds marks a major success for European financial enforcement bodies. Evidence suggests that this network functioned for at least six years, operating between 2018 and the beginning of 2024. During this period, the group exploited legal and financial systems in both France and Romania to conceal the criminal origins of their funds. A key operational method involved strategically acquiring control of legitimate businesses based in France. Through ownership of these companies, the organization was able to transfer funds through standard banking systems, significantly reducing the risk of detection compared to direct personal transfers. These businesses were not simple shell companies but fully functioning enterprises integrated into a carefully designed financial ecosystem meant to mislead tax regulators and banking compliance departments.

The massive sum of 306 million euros highlights the scale of illegal revenue—largely generated from narcotics distribution—that required sophisticated financial cleansing before entering the lawful economy. Rather than relying on traditional methods such as physical cash transportation, the group constructed a corporate-based laundering infrastructure. False invoices issued for non-existent services enabled money transfers between companies while also artificially lowering the taxable profits of participating firms. This dual-purpose scheme provided both laundering services and tax evasion advantages, making it especially appealing to organized crime networks. Every fabricated invoice created documentation that appeared legitimate but had no actual commercial basis.

After moving funds through the French corporate network, the criminal group then focused on converting their wealth into long-term tangible assets. Romania became the primary location for these investments, particularly in the real estate sector. Real estate remains a preferred laundering vehicle due to its ability to absorb large capital inflows while also offering potential appreciation in value. To further obscure ownership links, the group relied heavily on straw purchasers and trusted associates to officially hold property titles. By registering apartments, residential houses, and commercial land under the names of relatives or lower-ranking members, the main organizers attempted to evade detection by anti-money laundering monitoring systems and regulatory inspections.

This multi-layered ownership structure reflects a well-established global laundering strategy. It takes advantage of national privacy regulations and differences in property registration frameworks. Investigators found that the network consisted of dozens of participants, each assigned specialized tasks connected to purchasing and managing Romanian properties. The geographic range of law enforcement searches, including areas such as Cluj and Maramures, suggests the investment plan was nationwide rather than concentrated in a single location. The injection of illicit capital into real estate markets can artificially influence property prices while also generating stable legal income streams through rentals or resale transactions.

The operation carried out on February 3 was made possible by a joint investigation team coordinated and financed by Eurojust in The Hague. This structure enabled French investigating magistrates and the National Prosecutor’s Office Against Organised Crime to collaborate directly with Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism. Without this formalized cooperative framework, obtaining banking documentation and surveillance intelligence would have been significantly delayed by traditional mutual legal assistance procedures. The joint team allowed investigators to exchange intelligence in real time, which proved vital for tracking the movement of the 306 million euros through numerous financial accounts.

During the coordinated enforcement phase, authorities executed twenty-four residential searches. These operations resulted in the immediate seizure of approximately 400,000 euros in cash, along with various luxury watches, jewelry, and mobile devices. The confiscated phones are expected to provide key digital evidence, including communication records and encrypted messaging data, which could demonstrate coordination and criminal intent among the thirteen detained suspects. These physical assets also represent profits that will now be subject to asset forfeiture proceedings, preventing the organization from using those resources to re-establish operations.

The dismantling of this network significantly disrupts a major financial channel supporting drug trafficking operations across Western Europe. By focusing on the professional laundering infrastructure rather than only the drug trafficking networks themselves, law enforcement agencies have targeted a critical vulnerability in organized crime business models. Without reliable methods to legitimize illegal profits, criminal groups face increased operational risk and reduced access to liquid capital. This investigation also sends a strong signal to professionals who may knowingly or unknowingly provide corporate services to criminal organizations, demonstrating that misuse of legitimate French businesses and the Romanian real estate sector is under growing scrutiny. The involvement of specialized financial investigative units such as the BRIF in Paris reflects a strategic shift toward following financial flows rather than concentrating solely on underlying criminal offenses.

Future court proceedings are expected to concentrate heavily on proving the fraudulent nature of the fake invoicing system. Demonstrating that services listed on invoices were never actually delivered will require detailed forensic accounting analysis and examination of supplier transaction histories. Nevertheless, the enormous total amount of laundered funds—306 million euros—already positions this case as a significant milestone in recent Franco-Romanian judicial cooperation. The investigation highlights the need for continued monitoring of new business registrations and sudden acquisitions of small companies. As organized crime groups become increasingly skilled at replicating legitimate business operations, regulatory authorities and prosecutors must continue developing advanced tools capable of identifying subtle anomalies in financial behavior across the European Economic Area.

By fLEXI tEAM