Singapore Police Uncover Sophisticated Transnational Money-Laundering Network Linked to Prince TCO

The Singapore Police Force has unveiled one of the most intricate transnational money-laundering operations in recent memory, targeting the Prince Holding Group led by Chen Zhi and his associates. The investigation exposed a sprawling financial network spanning multiple jurisdictions, with illicit proceeds traced from scam operations and forced-labor schemes into luxury assets and corporate holdings. Authorities describe the case as a benchmark for Singapore’s commitment to maintaining integrity within its financial system and as a vivid demonstration of the global reach of financial crime.

On 30 October 2025, the Singapore Police Force executed a coordinated operation targeting properties, financial accounts, and high-value goods linked to Chen Zhi, the alleged mastermind behind Prince TCO. Enforcement actions resulted in seizure and prohibition of disposal orders over assets exceeding S$150 million. Confiscated items included six real-estate properties, numerous bank and securities accounts, large sums of cash, and luxury items such as a yacht, eleven high-end cars, and a collection of rare liquors.

Investigations were prompted by suspicious transaction intelligence that revealed unusual fund flows connected to entities under Prince Holding Group. Authorities traced the network across Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean, uncovering multiple layers of corporate ownership and fund transfers designed to conceal the origin of illicit proceeds. Analysts determined that the funds primarily originated from large-scale scam operations in Cambodia and neighboring countries, where victims were allegedly lured into fraudulent investment schemes, romance scams, and crypto-based hoaxes. Illicit profits were then funneled through a sophisticated web of shell companies, ultimately surfacing in legitimate-looking corporate accounts and asset portfolios in Singapore.

This operation underscores how criminal networks exploit robust financial jurisdictions to legitimize unlawful proceeds. Supported by domestic and international partners, the Singapore Police Force acted decisively once sufficient intelligence was consolidated. Through its Anti-Money Laundering Case Coordination and Collaboration Network, the operation ensured that asset-freezing and information-sharing mechanisms functioned effectively across agencies.

The laundering network followed a traditional three-phase cycle executed with exceptional sophistication. During the placement phase, fraudulent profits entered the financial system via intermediaries and low-value transfers. In the layering phase, these funds were fragmented and routed through multiple jurisdictions using corporate vehicles, trusts, and luxury acquisitions. By the integration phase, illicit money had been converted into tangible assets—including prime real estate, securities investments, and exclusive collectibles—that seamlessly blended with legitimate business holdings.

Prince TCO, operating as a conglomerate in real estate, finance, and consumer goods, served as the hub for integrating laundered funds under the guise of a legitimate commercial presence. Investigators revealed that subsidiary companies, often registered under nominees, were used to acquire high-value assets both in Singapore and abroad. These acquisitions not only obscured the origin of the funds but also allowed further leverage through resale, refinancing, or collateralization.

The network employed a diverse range of laundering channels. In addition to real estate, luxury vehicles, yachts, and rare liquors were used as repositories of wealth and mechanisms for layering transactions, offering both discreet transferability and stable value. Digital payments and crypto-asset transfers were also heavily used, involving hundreds of wallets and complex blockchain movements. The blending of fiat and crypto flows illustrated a hybrid laundering method increasingly observed in transnational financial crime.

The case highlights the importance of collaboration among financial intelligence units, regulators, and law enforcement. The Singapore Police Force’s rapid enforcement, coordinated with overseas authorities, enabled tracing, restraint, and freezing of assets across multiple industries and jurisdictions before they could be dissipated. For regulators, the case reinforces the need for comprehensive beneficial-ownership transparency. The network’s use of shell companies in multiple tax havens exposed vulnerabilities in corporate registration systems, emphasizing the necessity for stricter verification of ownership, enhanced due diligence on cross-border incorporations, and integration of beneficial-owner data into financial intelligence analysis.

Singapore’s Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992, which criminalizes the concealment or conversion of illicit proceeds, played a central role. The Act provides penalties of up to ten years’ imprisonment or fines reaching S$500,000 and empowers authorities to immobilize assets through prohibition of disposal orders pending final confiscation.

From an AML/CFT perspective, the case demonstrates the heightened exposure of high-value non-financial sectors, including real-estate agents, luxury-asset dealers, and trust and company service providers, which must strengthen internal controls and file timely suspicious-transaction reports. Crypto-asset service providers are under particular scrutiny, with the Prince TCO network highlighting the need for continuous blockchain analytics, counterparty screening, and real-time transaction monitoring. AI-driven tools capable of detecting layering patterns across both fiat and crypto channels will be increasingly central to effective compliance.

Financial institutions and AML professionals can draw multiple lessons. Enhanced beneficial-ownership analysis is critical, as static registry data is insufficient to uncover indirect control relationships. Monitoring of non-financial assets—such as yachts, premium vehicles, and collectibles—is necessary, particularly when acquisitions lack corresponding revenue streams. Cross-border pattern recognition should prompt enhanced due diligence on interconnected entities or family-office structures. Crypto-asset oversight must align with the Travel Rule and emerging international standards. Collaboration with law enforcement is essential to respond promptly to asset-freezing and prohibition orders. By studying this case, AML specialists can observe how a seemingly legitimate conglomerate leveraged complex corporate structures and cross-border transactions to launder illicit funds.

The Prince TCO case marks a defining moment in Singapore’s fight against sophisticated financial crime. With S$150 million in assets restrained, attention now shifts to prosecution, forfeiture, and international recovery proceedings. Regulators are expected to expand AML obligations for high-risk non-financial sectors and tighten beneficial-ownership disclosure requirements. Financial institutions will likely reinforce cross-border information-sharing and adopt technologies to detect typologies similar to those employed by Prince TCO. Global cooperation mechanisms, including mutual legal assistance and coordinated asset-recovery frameworks, will continue evolving to counter increasingly sophisticated transnational syndicates.

For compliance professionals, the case serves as a stark reminder that financial integrity is dynamic. Criminal networks continuously adapt, exploiting regulatory gaps and emerging technologies. The Singapore Police Force’s decisive action demonstrates that determined enforcement, intelligence integration, and international collaboration remain the most effective deterrents. As the investigation unfolds, it is poised to shape policy debates and compliance practices across the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, establishing a precedent for dismantling laundering networks disguised as legitimate enterprises.

By fLEXI tEAM