Seizure of Can Holding Exposes Massive Alleged Laundering Network in Turkey

The forced takeover of Can Holding by Turkish authorities has revealed one of the most striking cases of alleged financial crime in recent memory. The conglomerate, which held assets across media, education, finance, and energy, is accused of laundering huge volumes of illicit money through a deliberately engineered web of companies. The scandal has rattled investor confidence and cast a spotlight on the dangers of weak oversight, politically influenced ownership transfers, and gaps in financial regulation. For anti-money laundering professionals worldwide, the affair illustrates how illicit finance can infiltrate respected industries, distort competition, and consolidate political influence.

At the heart of the allegations is the claim that Can Holding operated as a sophisticated laundering platform. Investigators argue that its owners, Kemal Can and Mehmet Şakir Can, constructed a maze of more than 121 companies designed to move illicit money until it became indistinguishable from legitimate revenue. The use of such an extraordinary number of firms points to a strategy of deliberate layering, designed to create complexity and avoid detection.

The alleged laundering mechanisms were textbook in nature. Fake invoices disguised the flow of funds as ordinary transactions. Dormant firms suddenly received capital injections, funded with offshore money that had little or no documented origin. Once inside the corporate structure, these funds were used to acquire assets in high-profile sectors such as television, private schools, and universities. These industries not only provided steady revenue streams but also public legitimacy, an ideal combination for a group intent on securing influence.

Turkey’s “Asset Peace” laws provided the legal cover for moving such funds into the domestic economy. The program, which expired in March 2023, was originally designed to encourage repatriation of offshore wealth. It allowed individuals and companies to declare foreign-held capital, transfer it into Turkey, and integrate it into the system without having to prove its origins. Prosecutors allege that Can Holding relied heavily on this mechanism, disguising illicit cash as repatriated wealth and pushing it into its subsidiaries. For a conglomerate intent on gaining legitimacy and visibility, the program offered the perfect channel.

The state’s sweeping response reflects the scale of the suspected scheme. Can Holding and all of its 121 affiliated companies have been placed under the control of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund, the body typically tasked with managing seized businesses. The move is unusual given the group’s high-profile assets, which included television channels such as Haberturk and Show TV as well as major educational institutions like Istanbul Bilgi University and Doğa Koleji.

According to investigators, illicit funds were routed through shell companies and dormant firms before reappearing as shareholder investments. These “new” investments financed acquisitions in the media sector, allowing the holding to take over networks previously belonging to other owners. In this way, the laundering process both cleaned illicit cash and secured entry into sectors where influence over public opinion could be leveraged for further protection.

The scheme extended beyond simple transfers. By branching into education and finance, Can Holding reportedly created diversified laundering circuits. Private schools and universities produced stable cash flows that could be blended with illicit funds, making it increasingly difficult to separate clean capital from dirty money. Such integration shows how laundering schemes evolve from basic banking transactions into entire economic ecosystems.

The case is not only about illicit finance but also about systemic weaknesses in governance. The fact that such a vast structure could operate largely unchecked raises pressing questions about gaps in Turkey’s financial and corporate oversight. Asset seizures are a forceful intervention, but they remain reactive. Preventive measures—particularly transparency around beneficial ownership and scrutiny of capital increases—appear to have been inadequate in curbing the risks as they developed.

The political dimensions of the affair are equally significant. Can Holding’s acquisition of major media assets in 2024 already raised suspicions, given the group’s controversial history. Media ownership in Turkey is deeply entangled with political influence, and today more than 85 percent of outlets are under direct or indirect state control. The state’s takeover of Can Holding’s networks further entrenches that dominance.

The laundering allegations thus carry a double impact: undermining trust in corporate governance while intensifying concerns about diminishing media independence. While prosecutors have framed the case as a legitimate fight against organized crime, critics caution that such seizures—even when justified—risk bolstering political control over the press. For anti-money laundering practitioners, the lesson is clear: laundering often intersects with political and media landscapes, where enforcement becomes a delicate balance between justice and governance.

The Can Holding case carries broader lessons for regulators and compliance professionals worldwide. Complex conglomerates demand enhanced due diligence, particularly when ownership ties span multiple, unrelated sectors. Intra-group transactions, such as capital injections into dormant firms, require closer scrutiny. Repatriation programs, like Turkey’s “Asset Peace” law, show how policies intended to encourage capital inflows can create loopholes when origin checks are too lax. Media and education sectors, offering steady revenues, social credibility, and political leverage, are particularly attractive laundering vehicles but are often overlooked in comparison to banking or real estate.

Seizures, while powerful, cannot substitute for systemic reform. Ownership transparency, tighter monitoring of cross-border financial flows, and stronger corporate governance oversight are critical to preventing similar schemes. The global implications are far-reaching: when illicit funds enter legitimate industries, they distort competition, erode public trust, and damage financial stability. For countries eager to attract investment, the reputational fallout of scandals of this scale can be severe.

Ultimately, the Can Holding affair is a reminder that laundering is not confined to shadowy criminal groups. It can take the form of sprawling corporate empires that employ thousands, command public respect, and shape national discourse. For AML professionals, vigilance must extend far beyond the financial sector into the wider economy where illicit finance seeks legitimacy, influence, and permanence.

By fLEXI tEAM