OFAC Cracks Down on Hezbollah’s Financial Lifelines in Global Sanctions Sweep

In a decisive move aimed at crippling the financial foundation of Hezbollah, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on May 15, 2025, targeting two senior Hezbollah officials and two major money transfer facilitators. The action, authorized under Executive Order 13224, strikes at the heart of the financial networks Hezbollah relies upon, particularly those originating from Iran and Lebanon and extending into Africa. This effort is part of the broader strategy to cut off critical funding sources for Tehran’s proxies and disrupt their ability to operate across the Middle East and beyond.

Hezbollah has long depended on donations from a global support base, funneled through clandestine routes that avoid formal banking channels. One of the central figures now sanctioned is Mu’in Daqiq Al-‘Amili, a prominent Hezbollah agent stationed in Qom, Iran. Al-‘Amili has been instrumental in managing donations and delivering tens of thousands of dollars to Hezbollah finance heads closely aligned with Hassan Nasrallah’s inner circle. OFAC has identified that Al-‘Amili orchestrated the transfer of at least $50,000 between late 2023 and early 2024, funds believed to have helped fuel operations in Gaza and other areas of strategic interest to the organization.

Fadi Nehme, another newly sanctioned individual, is an accountant tied to Ibrahim Ali Daher—already designated by OFAC in 2021 for leading the group’s Central Finance Unit. Nehme’s ownership in Auditors for Accounting and Auditing, a firm blacklisted in December 2022, enabled the laundering of funds through seemingly legitimate financial services. These transactions allowed Hezbollah to move donor contributions under the guise of professional accounting work, effectively masking the flow of illicit money.

A third figure named in the Treasury’s announcement, Hasan Abdallah Ni’mah, played a pivotal role in managing and routing millions of dollars through Hezbollah-aligned networks operating in Africa. Ni’mah’s financial dealings funneled large sums to entities like the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, showcasing Hezbollah’s expansive international reach and the convergence of ideological and financial interests across borders.

Also designated is Jihad Alami (Alami), a Lebanese-based operative who served as a critical receiver and distributor of cash sourced by Al-‘Amili. Alami directed funds towards Hezbollah’s military, political, and propaganda activities, acting as a reliable conduit for Secretary General Nasrallah’s financial operations. His role underscores Hezbollah’s dependence on trusted handlers who can move funds discreetly and efficiently outside traditional banking frameworks.

“Today’s action underscores Hezbollah’s extensive global reach through its network of terrorist donors and supporters, particularly in Tehran,” stated Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Michael Faulkender. “As part of our ongoing efforts to address Iran’s support for terrorism, Treasury will continue to intensify economic pressure on the key individuals in the Iranian regime and its proxies who enable these deadly activities.”

These sanctions are grounded in the legal foundation of Executive Order 13224, first issued in the wake of the September 11 attacks and designed to freeze assets belonging to terrorists and their affiliates. This executive order has since been amended to expand its scope, empowering the Treasury Secretary to target those providing material support to terrorist entities. Hezbollah’s designation under this framework dates back to September 2001, laying the groundwork for today’s measures.

Further authority for these actions stems from National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), enacted in 2018 as part of a broader “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. NSPM-2 directs the U.S. government to disrupt financial channels supporting terrorist activities, ballistic missile programs, and other destabilizing efforts. Under its mandate, OFAC has already targeted Hezbollah’s oil sales operations and shell companies. The most recent designations now focus on the group’s advanced money transfer tactics.

OFAC’s enforcement operates under 31 C.F.R. Part 594, which outlines strict prohibitions for U.S. persons and institutions dealing with individuals and entities designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). Violations of these regulations can lead to severe civil fines under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and willful infractions can result in criminal penalties of up to $1 million and 20 years in prison. Secondary sanctions also loom large for non-U.S. financial institutions, which risk being cut off from U.S. correspondent banking relationships if found processing transactions on behalf of sanctioned Hezbollah actors.

Export control rules add an additional layer of restriction. Individuals or businesses placed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List face limitations under the Export Administration Regulations, barring them from obtaining dual-use goods without prior approval from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security.

The individuals designated represent vital arteries in Hezbollah’s global financial body. Al-‘Amili, with over two decades of experience coordinating foreign fundraising efforts from Iran, played a central role in bridging Hezbollah’s finances from Tehran to Beirut. Alami, acting within Lebanon, ensured the strategic deployment of funds for various facets of Hezbollah’s mission. Nehme exemplified how professional services can be repurposed for illicit finance, while Ni’mah’s operations in Africa reflected Hezbollah’s ambition to cultivate financial nodes across continents.

The immediate effect of these designations is the blocking of any assets or property interests in the United States tied to these individuals and associated entities. U.S. entities must freeze any such assets and cease all dealings. Financial institutions are expected to implement enhanced due diligence procedures, particularly when dealing with clients from regions known for Hezbollah activity. Non-compliance carries substantial financial and legal risks.

For non-U.S. financial institutions, the pressure is just as intense. By continuing relationships with Hezbollah-linked entities, they risk forfeiting access to the U.S. financial system. The sanctions also impact Hezbollah’s ability to procure advanced technology or materials, with export controls restricting access to goods with military or surveillance applications.

Investigations into violations often involve close collaboration between regulatory bodies and law enforcement, with OFAC placing high value on voluntary disclosures and strong compliance frameworks. Nevertheless, the agency maintains the right to impose significant penalties, as demonstrated by recent high-profile settlements over sanctions breaches related to Iran.

Ultimately, this action sends a stark warning to those who would engage with Hezbollah financially. The U.S. government’s strategy is clear: by identifying and dismantling key facilitators, it aims to undermine Hezbollah’s capacity to maintain influence and execute attacks. The effects extend beyond the designated individuals, serving as a deterrent to the broader financial community. As Hezbollah attempts to recover and recalibrate, the Treasury’s crackdown signals that the cost of complicity is rising sharply. Continued vigilance and coordination will be essential in maintaining financial pressure and curbing the group’s transnational reach.

By fLEXI tEAM