MAS Slaps S$27.45 Million in Fines on Nine Financial Institutions Over Singapore’s Largest-Ever Money Laundering Scandal

Singapore’s Monetary Authority has taken the gloves off. On 4 July 2025, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) announced sweeping enforcement action against nine financial institutions, levying a combined S$27.45 million in fines after concluding an extensive two-year investigation into the city-state’s most staggering money laundering case. The crackdown, which has rocked Singapore’s financial world, comes in the aftermath of the notorious August 2023 scandal that exposed glaring weaknesses in anti-money laundering (AML) controls and revealed systemic vulnerabilities across some of the country's most trusted financial entities.

The investigation unearthed far-reaching lapses in compliance, with failures not just at the institutional level but also among senior executives and compliance staff. The MAS, in a move meant to restore shaken confidence in Singapore’s reputation as a global financial hub, delivered its message loud and clear: there will be zero tolerance for AML failures. The regulator didn’t stop at fines. It also imposed prohibition orders on individuals holding key managerial and compliance roles, and reprimanded others for oversight failings. The broad scale of the enforcement measures serves as both a cautionary tale and a benchmark for financial institutions operating within—and beyond—Singapore’s jurisdiction.

The roots of this crisis stretch back to 15 August 2023, when Singapore police raided multiple locations and arrested 10 foreign nationals with ties to a sprawling online gambling and scam syndicate, later dubbed the “Fujian gang.” At the time, initial seizures included assets worth more than S$1 billion. But as investigations deepened, authorities uncovered an even larger web of illicit wealth, pushing the value of confiscated assets to around S$3 billion. The cache included luxury vehicles, real estate, jewelry, Bearbricks, gold bars, and large quantities of cash. The 10 accused—predominantly Chinese nationals holding multiple passports—were convicted between early and mid-2024, receiving jail sentences ranging from 13 to 17 months, followed by deportation and permanent bans from re-entry into Singapore. In a related development, two former bankers were also sentenced in August 2023 for falsifying tax and loan documents.

MAS’s regulatory examinations—conducted from early 2023 to early 2025—targeted financial institutions found to have had dealings with the individuals implicated in the scandal. The inspections uncovered systemic shortcomings across various AML/CFT areas, particularly in how institutions evaluated customer risk, corroborated source of wealth, and monitored suspicious transactions. While the institutions had AML/CFT policies on paper, many failed in the actual implementation, either due to inconsistent procedures or ineffective controls.

The fines reflect the relative exposure of each financial institution to the scandal and the extent of its compliance failures. The biggest penalties were handed to Credit Suisse Singapore Branch (CSSB) and United Overseas Bank Limited (UOB), which were fined S$5.8 million and S$5.6 million respectively. UBS AG Singapore Branch (UBSS) followed with S$3 million. Citibank N.A. Singapore and Citibank Singapore Limited—collectively referred to as “Citi”—were fined S$2.6 million. Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd. Singapore Branch (BJBS) was penalized S$2.4 million, as was Blue Ocean Invest Pte. Ltd. (BOIPL). UOB Kay Hian Private Limited (UOBKH) was fined S$2.85 million. LGT Bank (Singapore) Ltd. (LGTS) incurred a S$1 million penalty, while Trident Trust Company (Singapore) Pte. Limited (TTCSPL) was fined S$1.8 million.

MAS explained that it had calibrated these penalties according to “the severity and extent of the institutions’ breaches,” while also taking into account the effectiveness of existing AML/CFT frameworks. Credit Suisse, notably, was held accountable for additional violations dating back to November 2017 related to accounts held by US customers—an aggravating factor contributing to its hefty fine.

Across the board, MAS identified persistent weaknesses in four main areas. First, five institutions—BJBS, BOIPL, Citi, CSSB, and UOBKH—demonstrated “insufficiently robust” methodologies for customer risk assessments, leading to misclassified high-risk clients and ineffective mitigation measures. Second, all nine institutions were found to have failed in properly corroborating the source of wealth for high-risk customers, often neglecting clear inconsistencies or failing to escalate red flags. Third, eight institutions—BJBS, Citi, CSSB, LGTS, UOB, UOBKH, TTCSPL, and UBSS—fell short in reviewing suspicious transaction alerts, in many cases neglecting to act on large or inconsistent transactions. Lastly, UOB and UOBKH were flagged for failing to implement adequate risk mitigation measures even after filing suspicious transaction reports.

In addition to financial penalties, MAS brought enforcement against individuals who were found to have failed in their compliance responsibilities. Four senior executives from BOIPL received prohibition orders barring them from financial sector activities for periods ranging from three to six years. These included Tsao Chung-Yi, the CEO and Executive Director (six years); Wong Xuan Ling, COO (five years); Hsia Lun Wei, also known as Henry Hsia, Executive Director and Relationship Manager (three years); and Deng Xixi, a former Relationship Manager (three years). According to MAS, these individuals were responsible for “serious failings” in developing and maintaining effective AML/CFT systems, conducting proper due diligence, and addressing known red flags.

Public reprimands were also issued to senior leaders at TTCSPL over shortcomings in customer due diligence and source of wealth verification. Former team leaders at UOB were similarly reprimanded for inadequate due diligence practices and risk escalation failures. Meanwhile, nine other relationship managers and supervisors were privately reprimanded for less serious, though still material, compliance failures.

The authority based its actions on specific MAS notices and acts applicable to each financial institution. These include MAS Notice 626 for banks, MAS Notice 1014 for merchant banks, MAS Notice SFA04-N02 for capital markets intermediaries, and MAS Notice TCA-N03 for licensed trust companies. Violations of these notices constitute offences under section 27B(2) of the MAS Act 1970 and section 16(4) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 (FSMA). Fines were compounded under section 176(1A) of the MAS Act and section 177(1) of the FSMA, which allow penalties of up to S$1 million per breach.

MAS has followed up its enforcement with new supervisory guidance, pressing financial institutions to enhance risk-based controls, improve customer due diligence—especially for high-risk clients—and ensure transaction monitoring systems are calibrated to flag unusual activity effectively. Institutions are expected to align their frameworks not only with MAS standards but also global best practices. “Vigilance and robust first-line compliance are essential to the integrity of Singapore’s financial system,” MAS noted in its enforcement statement, making it clear that future failures will carry serious consequences.

This landmark action sets a precedent not only for Singapore but for the broader region. MAS’s strong enforcement has underscored the city-state’s uncompromising stance on financial crime and is expected to usher in a wave of internal reforms, tighter audits, and a stronger compliance culture across the financial services industry. The case serves as a reminder that mere policy documentation is not enough—effective implementation, accountability, and a culture of compliance are what truly safeguard the integrity of financial systems. As the dust settles, the lessons from this episode will reverberate far beyond Singapore’s borders.

By fLEXI tEAM