Ex-Janus Henderson Analyst and Sister Convicted in £1M Insider Trading and Money Laundering Operation

The UK’s commitment to tackling financial crime has been reinforced through the high-profile conviction of former Janus Henderson analyst Redinel Korfuzi and his sister.

Their elaborate insider trading and money laundering scheme, which yielded over £1 million in illegal proceeds, exposes how financial professionals can manipulate privileged access for personal profit and exploit weaknesses in financial systems.

A Deep Dive Into the Insider Trading Scheme

While employed at Janus Henderson Investors, Korfuzi had access to sensitive and non-public information on listed companies. He used this data to anticipate stock price movements ahead of official announcements, creating an unlawful edge in the markets.

Between December 2019 and March 2021, Korfuzi and his sister capitalized on this advantage by trading the shares of at least 13 companies.

Their method of choice was Contracts for Difference (CFDs), which allowed them to take short positions before negative corporate news became public and close them for significant gains afterward. To hide his involvement, Korfuzi did not trade using his own accounts.

Instead, trades were made through accounts held by his sister, a friend, and the friend’s partner—an intentional setup to mask his role and distribute both the activity and potential risk across several individuals and platforms.

The operation might have gone unnoticed were it not for the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) advanced market surveillance systems. These systems flagged trading anomalies that were inconsistent with standard market behavior. “Even as efforts were made to avoid detection by splitting trades and profits,” the FCA’s tools detected suspicious activity, prompting a deeper probe.

Laundering Illicit Gains

Beyond the insider trading, the FCA uncovered a structured money laundering process. From January 2019 to March 2021, Korfuzi and his sister made 176 cash deposits totaling nearly £200,000. These transactions bore no connection to their legitimate income and drew regulatory attention. This activity fit the “placement” stage of traditional money laundering—introducing illicit funds into the financial system in amounts and frequencies designed to fly under regulatory thresholds.

The scheme didn’t end there. Once funds were placed, they were “layered” through various transfers, including some to offshore accounts and those held in the names of unrelated individuals. The aim was clear: integrate the laundered money into the financial system and sever any links to the original crimes. The complexity of these steps underscores how far perpetrators will go to conceal criminal proceeds.

Legal Context and Compliance Failures

The UK’s anti-money laundering (AML) framework—anchored by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA)—targets such abuses. POCA in particular makes it illegal to transfer, hide, or convert funds obtained through crime. Korfuzi’s pattern of repeated cash deposits and usage of third-party accounts was in direct breach of these statutes.

The FCA’s role as the UK’s financial watchdog has evolved to include cutting-edge surveillance tech capable of flagging high-risk trading and banking behavior. For professionals in investment firms, especially those with access to non-public market information, this means increased scrutiny. Korfuzi’s trades, often quickly followed by profits and suspicious cash movement, aligned closely with patterns FCA’s algorithms are built to catch.

Under current UK law, firms must implement robust AML programs that include:

• Customer due diligence (CDD) and enhanced due diligence (EDD),

• Continuous transaction monitoring,

• Filing of suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the National Crime Agency (NCA), and

• Regular training for staff with privileged access.

Korfuzi’s case is a powerful reminder that financial firms must not only monitor clients, but also their own personnel. Any unexplained wealth, unusual trading behavior, or financial activity inconsistent with a professional’s role must be investigated thoroughly.

Red Flags That Led to the Fall

The FCA’s investigation revealed several critical indicators of illicit behavior:

• Use of third-party accounts to conduct trades and receive profits in an attempt to remain anonymous.

• A high frequency of small cash deposits, which in total amounted to significant sums while individually avoiding detection triggers.

• Movement of money across multiple accounts, including those offshore, to obstruct any clear audit trail.

• Lifestyle and asset purchases that couldn’t be justified by declared income.

• Leveraging CFDs, which provide both rapid liquidity and an extra layer of opacity for financial criminals.

These are all classic AML typologies that modern compliance teams must be trained to recognize. The Korfuzi case makes clear that sophisticated laundering operations often involve individuals who understand the inner workings of financial compliance systems—and how to work around them.

Implications for the Investment Industry

Korfuzi’s conviction sends a strong message to the financial sector. Investment firms must take a more integrated approach to market abuse and AML surveillance. Among the critical lessons highlighted by this case:

• Firms should unify AML and market abuse systems rather than treating them as separate silos.

• Employees with access to non-public information need more stringent and ongoing reviews—not just at hiring but throughout their tenure.

• Adoption of advanced analytics and machine learning tools is crucial to detecting nuanced patterns in trading and personal financial activity.

• Firms must cultivate a compliance-first culture, empowering staff to spot irregularities and use whistleblower channels safely.

• Intelligence-sharing, both internally and with regulators, strengthens the broader ecosystem’s ability to combat sophisticated financial crime.

It’s also vital to understand that financial crime often extends beyond firm boundaries. Family members or friends may unknowingly—or knowingly—facilitate laundering, adding further complexity to detection and prosecution.

Sentencing and Asset Recovery to Follow

Following the conviction of Redinel Korfuzi and his sister, sentencing and asset confiscation proceedings are now underway. These steps are critical to reinforcing the message that insider dealing and money laundering come with serious consequences, including criminal penalties and the forfeiture of illicit profits.

Two other individuals charged in connection with the case—Rogerio de Aquino and Dema Almeziad—were acquitted, illustrating the evidentiary challenges in proving intent and direct participation in complex financial schemes.

Financial Crime Still a Threat Despite Regulation

The Korfuzi case makes it clear that even in tightly regulated environments, insider-driven financial crime is still a real and present danger. No firm, regardless of reputation, is immune. This underscores the importance of continuous monitoring, updated compliance tools, and a vigilant culture.

The message to the industry is unequivocal: financial professionals who choose to exploit their access and breach regulatory obligations will be found, prosecuted, and stripped of their illicit gains. As the FCA’s detection systems grow more advanced, the window for operating in the shadows continues to narrow. 

By fLEXI tEAM